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ABSTRACT 
This article argues that universities have duties to negotiate contracts with the pharmaceutical industry that are 
favourable to the world’s poor, and to do more research into diseases which disproportionately strike the global 
poor. It is argued that these duties are related to human rights (in particular to a human right to health) and that 
they are therefore very weighty. Furthermore, these duties are in line with some of the most important things that 
Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM), a worldwide group of students and academics, wants 
universities to do. A number of objections are discussed, among other things to do with safeguarding 
pharmaceutical innovation, and it is argued that the aforementioned duties should, as UAEM also advocates, 
often be combined with efforts on the part of universities to work towards more long-term, large-scale 
institutional arrangements to ensure access to and availability of essential medicines for the global poor. 
Keywords: moral duties of universities, essential medicines, human rights, human right to health, ethics/moral 
philosophy 
RESUME 
Cet article soutient que les universités ont le devoir de négocier des contrats avec l'industrie pharmaceutique qui 
sont favorables aux pauvres dans le monde et de faire plus de recherches sur les maladies qui touchent de manière 
disproportionnée les pauvres dans le monde. On soutient que ces devoirs sont liés aux Droits de l'homme (en 
particulier à un droit humain à la santé) et qu'ils sont donc très importants. En outre, ces fonctions correspondent 
à certaines des choses les plus importantes que les universités alliées pour les médicaments essentiels (UAEM), 
un groupe mondial d'étudiants et d'universitaires, souhaitent que les universités fassent. Un certain nombre 
d'objections sont discutées, entre autres pour protéger l'innovation pharmaceutique, et il est soutenu que les 
fonctions susmentionnées devraient souvent, comme le préconise l'UAEM, être combinées avec les efforts des 
universités pour travailler à plus long terme, à des arrangements institutionnels à grande échelle pour assurer 
l'accès et la disponibilité des médicaments essentiels pour les pauvres dans le monde. 
Mots clés : devoirs moraux des universités ; médicaments essentiels ; Droits de l'homme ; droit de l'homme à la 
santé ; éthique ; philosophie morale 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM), a worldwide initiative by university 
students and staff, wants universities to, among other things, conclude contracts with the 
pharmaceutical industry that are more favourable to the world’s poor. It also wants them to 
do more research into relatively neglected diseases that disproportionately strike the global 
poor, such as tropical diseases. Do universities have moral duties to do these things? To be 
more precise, do they have duties here which are related to human rights, more particularly 
to a human right to health? This will be the central question of the present article. Thus its 
aim will not be to investigate all the duties that universities have in relation to a human right 
to health, but rather ask whether they have duties to do certain important things that UAEM 
wants them to do, and whether these are duties connected to human rights and a human right 
to health. 
Under the current arrangements patent holders often have monopolistic price setting powers 
across the globe, and this may and frequently does result in very high prices as the industry 
can set prices so as to maximize its profits (cf. Mannan and Story 2006). In the face of this, 
UAEM has, among other things, been pressing for arrangements where monopoly rights are 
limited to rich markets (cf. Stevens and Effort 2008). UAEM states, as an introduction to its 
licensing framework, that ‘[e]very university-developed technology with potential for further 
development into a drug, vaccine, or medical diagnostic should be licensed with a concrete 
and transparent strategy to make affordable versions available in resource-limited countries 
for medical care.’
2
 One such strategy is global access licensing, where contracts have a 
clause to ensure the possibility of generic production if this is needed to benefit people in 
low- and middle-income countries.
3
  
UAEM is mainly focused on universities, but not exclusively so: its mission is that 
‘medicines and health technologies, particularly those developed at universities or with 
public funding, are made accessible and affordable to people in resource-limited settings 
through open access and open source IP [intellectual property] mechanisms…’
4
 and to 
‘dramatically increase publicly funded biomedical R&D for the global health needs of 
neglected populations, especially through the use of sustainable funding mechanisms, and 
innovative open-knowledge approaches to research.’
5
 UAEM has also thrown its weight 
behind an international, WHO-sponsored initiative to arrive at a global research- and 
development agreement which seeks ‘a binding commitment of WHO Member States to 
ensure sustainable funding for R&D based on global health needs.’
6
 UAEM has a petition 
                                                 
2
 http://uaem.org/our-work/global-access-licensing-framework/ (accessed 2 April  2017). 
3
 As Rachel Kiddell-Monroe explains at http://uaem.org/who-we-are/history/ (accessed 2 April 2017).   
4
 http://uaem.org/our-work/ (accessed 2 April 2017), emphasis mine. 
5
 ibid., emphasis mine. I will not go into empowerment, which UAEM mentions, in addition to access 
and innovation, as the third pillar of its work: ‘UAEM students are empowered to stand at the 
vanguard of leadership in global health access and innovation...’ (ibid.) 
6
 See http://uaem.org/our-work/campaigns/the-alternative-biomedical-rd-system-campaign/ (accessed 
2 April 2017; https://uaem.wufoo.com/forms/make-medicines-for-people-not-for-profit/ (accessed 2 
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available for academics to sign on to this initiative, but the initiative itself is primarily 
directed at WHO member states, and UAEM engages directly with politicians and delegates 
as well. Through supporting this initiative, and urging universities to support it, UAEM 
seeks to achieve wide-ranging structural changes – something to which I will come back at 
the end of the article; but my main focus in the article will be on UAEM’s initiatives urging 
universities to conclude contracts with the pharmaceutical industry which are more 
favourable to the world’s poor, and to do more research into neglected diseases that 
disproportionately strike the global poor. 
These UAEM initiatives are still ongoing, and UAEM has over 46 local branches (or, as it 
calls them, ‘chambers’) worldwide now.
7
 Thus it is not merely of academic interest to 
investigate whether what UAEM wants universities to do is in line with the human-rights 
duties of universities. On the contrary, this would also be practically important. 
By universities will be meant institutions whose mission it is to do research, and often also to 
provide education – later on I will further explain this mission, and the place of universities 
in society. Their research focus may be very broad (covering all major fields of knowledge) 
or relatively narrow. Their funding can be public but I also want to consider universities that 
are (partly) privately funded; it will be investigated later on whether this makes a difference 
for the arguments that this article will advance. In addition, the duties of diverse agents 
within the university will be considered, such as university boards and university presidents, 
students and researchers. 
The article will argue that universities, and more specifically certain agents within them, 
have human-rights related (moral) duties
8
 to improve the access to and availability of 
essential medicines for the world’s poor, as UAEM wants them to, in particular to conclude 
contracts with the pharmaceutical industry that include arrangements such as global access 
licensing and to do more research into neglected diseases such as tropical diseases – which 
currently only receive a tiny percentage of research funding.
9
 
By essential medicines I mean medicines on the WHO ‘Model List of Essential 
Medicines.’
10 
These are medicines ‘that satisfy the priority health care needs of the 
population… [They] are selected with due regard to disease prevalence and public health 
relevance, evidence of clinical efficacy and safety, and comparative costs and cost-
effectiveness.’
11 
With regard to cost-effectiveness, it is important that the WHO adds:
12
 
                                                                                                                                          
April 2017). This is one initiative, then, that envisages delinking pharmaceutical innovation from the 
price of medicine. 
7
 http://uaem.org/who-we-are/history/ (accessed 2 April 2017). 
8
 By a (moral) duty, I mean a decisive moral reason to do something (Kagan 1989, 65). In daily usage, 
many people prefer to speak of a ‘(moral) responsibility’ (a term which may have a more palatable 
ring to it) to refer to such a decisive moral reason. It is a moot point whether it is appropriate to use 
the two terms interchangeably (cf. Goodin 1986). I will stick to the term ‘(moral) duty’ throughout. I 
will not be concerned with legal duties (cf. the elucidation of the concept of a human right, in Section 
2.1 below). 
9
 See e.g. Musselwhite e.a. 2012. 
10
 see http://www.who.int/medicines/services/essmedicines_def/en (accessed 2 April 2017) 
11
 ibid. 




‘(1) the absolute cost of a medicine will not be a reason to exclude it from the Model List if 
it meets the stated selection criteria, and (2) cost-effectiveness comparisons be made among 
alternative medicines within the same therapeutic group (e.g., identifying the most cost-
effective drug treatment to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV).’
13 
The relation of the UAEM-proposals with essential medicines can now be specified as 
follows. UAEM’s access initiatives, urging universities to conclude contracts with the 
pharmaceutical industry that are more favourable for the global poor, will likely have the 
effect that more medicines currently on the list will actually become affordable in low- and 
middle income countries. In addition, by changing relative cost-effectiveness these access 
initiatives can have the result that certain medicines make it to the list (sometimes but not 




There have to my knowledge been no previous attempts to investigate whether universities 
have moral duties, and more particularly duties related to human rights, to do the things that 
UAEM wants them to do.
15
 This is where the scientific contribution lies that the present 
article aims to make. There has been research with somewhat related aims which is of 
relevance for the present investigation. For instance, it has been pointed out that universities 
are in a good position to do the things that UAEM urges them to do, given the motivation of 
their staff and given their negotiation room vis-à-vis the pharmaceutical industry 
(Kapczynski et al. 2005; Hassoun 2010), and also that a lot can be done within the existing 
juridical frameworks (ibid.). In addition, there have been discussions about the moral duties 
of universities in the face of commercialization more generally (e.g. Olivieri 2003; Mintz, 
Savage and Carter 2010) and of the moral duties, also human-rights related ones, of other 
                                                                                                                                          
12
 At the same time, there remains concern among critics that, inasmuch as 95% of the list are off-
patent, cost does play a role after all. See e.g. Selgelid and Sepers 2006; cf. also 





 This of course requires elaborate empirical underpinning, but to provide that in detail is beyond the 
present scope. It should be remarked that talk of ‘effective contributions’ of universities (i.e. effective 
contributions while taking a lot of the present, highly non-ideal world as given) commonly 
presupposes that other agents will take up, much in the way they are currently doing even in our 
highly non-ideal world, the accomplishments of universities: for example, that NGOs will use newly 
developed medicines against tropical diseases in their emergency hospitals, and that a number of 
governments will avail themselves of possibilities for generic production. In other words, common 
talk of ‘effective contributions’ does not presuppose that universities achieve everything by 
themselves, without others being involved. (Also, commonly talk of ‘effective contributions’ does not 
deal very much in abstract counterfactuals of the kind ‘if universities had not done it someone else 
might have come along’. Such a thought is important if there are concrete reasons to think that 
something else –and possibly better– would have happened if universities had not done certain things. 
But otherwise such a thought should play no role in thinking of ‘effective contributions’.) In this 
article I will in the regards just mentioned stick to the common talk about effective contributions. 
15
 Some first elements of a moral argument might, very briefly and often implicitly, be found at 
http://uaem.org/who-we-are/history/ (accessed 2 April 2017). 
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agents such as businesses and governments in making essential medicines accessible and 
available for the world’s poor (e.g. Cohen, Illingworth and Schuklenk 2006; Pogge 2008; 
Forman and Kohler 2012). But there have not, as far as I can see, been discussions focusing 
explicitly on the question of what are the moral duties of universities to do the things that 
UAEM urges them to do. Yet this is obviously an important question.
16
 Furthermore, if it 
could be shown that the moral duties that universities have here are duties of human rights – 
more particularly related to a human right to health – this would show these duties to be 
particularly weighty. Not living up to these duties would be an especially serious failure.  
The article will be structured as follows. First, I will provide the necessary conceptual 
clarification: I will briefly explain what shall be understood by human rights and by a human 
right to health (Section 2.1). I will then go into the question of how to determine who bears 
duties in relation to human rights (Section 2.2). Subsequently, it will be argued that the poor 
indeed have human rights to improved access to and availability of essential medicines 
(Section 3.1). And I will argue that, as UAEM contends, universities indeed have duties in 
relation to these human rights (Section 3.2).
17
 A number of important objections to the claim 
that universities have such duties will also be discussed and answered (Section 3.3). Section 
4 concludes.  
2. HUMAN RIGHTS, A HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH, AND HOW TO DETERMINE 
WHO BEARS DUTIES 
2.1. Conceptual clarification: Human rights and a human right to health 
What are human rights? I will regard human rights as the minimum requirements of global 
justice. Human rights, in the words of Charles Beitz, are ‘requirements whose object is to 
protect urgent individual interests against certain predictable dangers’ (Beitz 2009, 109).
18
 It 
should be stressed that this understanding of human rights is not meant as an interpretation 
of how they are understood in the post-World War II practice of human rights – that is to 
say, in the practice where the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a number of 
treaties and institutions are central.
19
 Rather, it should be regarded as proposal for what one 
                                                 
16
 In addressing it, this article also aims to contribute to the philosophical literature on human rights 
(some central references are Gewirth 1978, 2007; Shue 1996; Rawls 1999b; Donnelly 2006; Nickel 
2007; Pogge 2008; Griffin 2008; Beitz 2009; Buchanan 2013, and for the human right to health 
Daniels 2008, Wolff 2012; Schmitz 2012; Hassoun 2015). 
17
 When considering the question of who bears duties in relation to human rights, and why universities 
bear certain duties, I will generally be employing a reflective equilibrium method (see Rawls 1971). 
Broadly put, the endeavour will be to systematize and (through considering coherence, implications 
etc.) critically hone initial intuitions. Thus an account will emerge that can be accepted ‘on reflection’ 
(cf. Rawls 1971, 587). 
18
 This formulation owes much to Shue 1996 (13ff.). Although I adopt Beitz’s formulation here, my 
conception of human rights differs in many ways from his, as will become clear shortly. The aim of 
the present section will only be to make clear what my conception of human rights is, not to defend 
this conception against alternatives.  
19
 Such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, and the European American and African regional human rights regimes with their treaties and 
courts. 
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may take the normative point of this practice to be. As such, it may possibly be revisionary 
vis-à-vis the understandings in the practice, but it also strives to be to a considerable extent 
continuous with them, so as not to change the subject (Griffin 2008, 3). My conception, then, 
conceives of human rights as the minimum requirements of global justice  –it is thus, 
emphatically, a moral conception and not a juridical one–  and does so in a way that is 
considerably continuous with the international practice, and that can therefore orient the 
development of the practice.
20
  
Which protections of important interests ought in the end to be provided as a matter of 
human rights plausibly depends on several factors, such as: the importance of the interest in 
question, the degree to which it is threatened, the possibility of providing effective 
protection, the availability of suitable duty bearers, and also seemingly more utilitarian 
considerations such as the number of people who are threatened and the opportunity cost of 
providing the protection.
21
 At the same time, the selection of protections should be guided by 
the idea that all human beings are fundamentally equal (cf. Buchanan 2013). 
Health is an interest which is so important that it will likely always require some important 
protections. This means, following the notion of human rights that was proposed above, that 
there will be a human right to health: health will have to be protected against ‘certain 
predictable dangers’ (see e.g. Beitz 2009, 109).
22
 At a relatively general level, one may think 
of a human right to health as an entitlement to certain health care facilities and medicines as 
well as certain public health measures and ways to ensure a healthy environment, etc.
23
 
Hence this human right does not immediately require the particular protections of health that 
UAEM advocates; whether it does so remains to be seen. 
It may be thought that whether there is a human right to health will also depend on the notion 
of health one employs. However, I think that there will be such a human right as long as the 
notion of health employed is remotely plausible. The most plausible one may, rather than a 
very broad or highly normative notion, be a biological notion, referring to the normal state of 
an organism (cf. Daniels 1985; 2008, Ch. 2). To this notion some statistical additions may 
have to be made to accommodate, for example, the rising life expectancy. However, I lack 
the space to discuss this here. For the present purposes it is important, firstly, that the notion 
                                                 
20
 Cf. [Philips 2015]. Importantly, the conception is not dependent on highly controversial 
metaphysical or religious assumptions. Although I do not claim that all theorists of human rights 
could subscribe to this conception, I do think that theorists of various persuasions could converge on 
it: more ‘practical’ and more ‘orthodox’ authors (see Beitz 2009), interest- and will-theorists (cf. 
Wenar 2015), those who want philosophically to theorise human rights in terms of moral rights and 
those who do not (see Buchanan 2013).  
21
 That there are human rights at all, also plausibly draws on the importance of certain interests and on 
some agents being suitable candidates for protecting those. Cf. Nickel 2007, Ch. 4; Griffin 2008; and 
for a different account see Gewirth 2007. For the apparently more utilitarian considerations, cf. Nickel 
2007, Ch. 4; Goldschmidt 2012; [Philips 2016]. 
22
 Thus a human right to health is not a right to be/remain healthy no matter what (this understanding 
would make nonsense of the entire notion). For a survey of how a human right to health is understood 
in the literature see Schmitz 2012; Hassoun 2015. Of course, protecting health is also instrumental for 
the protection of a number of other important interests, which is particularly important because the 
global poor face multiple disadvantages with regard to the protection of their important interests. 
23
 cf. UDHR, Art 25(1), ICESCR, Art. 12.2.  
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of health employed is not too broad, so as to avoid that it covers nearly everything, as is the 
case with for example the much disputed WHO-definition, where health is regarded as ‘a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity.’
24
 Secondly, a notion of health is needed, for the present purposes, 
where it does not follow by definition that there is a human right to health: this should be 
established by argument not stipulation.  
2.2. How to determine who bears duties in relation to human rights 
Several considerations have to be taken into account, I said, to decide whether a certain 
protection should in the end be provided as a matter of human rights. Among these is the 
importance of the interest in question; and it must also be considered what other important 
interests call for protection. Another important consideration, which I now want to discuss 
further, is whether there are good candidates for providing the protection – in other words, 




Generally speaking, three considerations plausibly guide the allocation of duties (cf. Shue 
1996; Miller 2005), always assuming that we are dealing with very important interests. First, 
the causal contribution that an agent has made to a protection’s being necessary in the first 
place, for example: the causal contribution the agent made to some people’s health being 
particularly at risk, due to environmental hazards etc. Second, the capacity of an agent to 
provide a certain protection. Third, that the allocation of duties must not be manifestly 
unfair, for example because by the first two criteria a far more suitable duty bearer is clearly 
available. 
These conditions are in some form widely accepted. Let me elaborate on causal involvement 
and capacity as reasons for holding that an agent has a duty. Someone makes a causal 
contribution to a human rights problem if they actively bring about such a problem (cf. 
Scheffler 2001). The clearest cases are those where an agent poses an active threat to a very 
important interest of others (e.g. they make them severely ill by releasing a chemical 
substance).
26
 As for capacity, this reason for attributing duties cannot plausibly take the form 
of saying that whenever one is capable of doing great good, or providing important 
protections of important interests, one must do so – simply because one is able to. This is too 
short a route to duties. It is more plausible to say that if one can provide an important 
protection of an important interest at little cost to oneself, one must do so. This is best 
understood as a sufficient rather than necessary condition: one must in any case take action if 
one can do so at little cost. To illustrate, if someone is confronted with a person in great 
need, and she can help this person at a cost which is small, she ought to do so (cf. Singer 
1972). This is not necessarily monetary cost but should be taken more broadly. For example, 
                                                 
24
 Preamble to the Constitution of WHO as adopted by the International Health Conference, New 
York, 19 June - 22 July 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States (Official 
Records of WHO, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 April 1948.  
25
 Here I follow what James Nickel (2007) has called an ‘entitlement conception’ of human rights: 
only if there is clarity about the duty bearers can we speak of a human right. 
26
 In addition, there may be cases where an agent should clearly, as a matter of human rights, provide 
a certain protection but fails to do. But in such cases, the causal involvement is so to say ‘parasitic’ on 
other reasons for attributing duties. 
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expending certain amounts of effort or time would generally also count as small cost. I will 
consider in a moment what could plausibly count as little cost for universities. 
Furthermore, if it is costly to take action, one may sometimes nonetheless have to do so. For 
instance, when one is causally involved in a problem, having helped to bring it about or 
helping it persist, one may sometimes have to take action if the cost to oneself is not small.
27
  
It might be objected that it is at odds with the deontological nature of rights to appeal to an 
agent’s capacity, or to what she can do at little cost, as a ground for her duties. In particular, 
one plausible human right may be a human right to property and intellectual property. Now 
if an agent has such a human right,
28
 does this not imply that she has a moral permission to 
use her (intellectual) property as she sees fit? If so, she cannot have a moral duty to use it to 
protect certain interests of others if she has the capacity to do so, or to do so at little cost. In 
reply, I do not believe that a human right to (intellectual) property plausibly implies this. It 
does plausibly imply that certain protections should be in place of one’s ability to enjoy an 
object (a house, a vehicle etc.) or the fruits of a scientific or artistic creation, without others 
interfering with this enjoyment. However, it is compatible with this that one could have a 
moral duty to use the object or the creation in question to provide, of one’s own accord, 
certain protections of important interest of others. For example, it may be that a sum of 
money is mine, and that others ought morally to refrain from taking it from me and that 
someone who does take it from me should face effective sanctions. But I can still have a 
moral duty to give my money away. One ground for such a moral duty could also be  –this 
is, as just argued, not incompatible with what having a right implies–  that one can help 
people in need out at little cost to oneself. Thus accepting a human right to (intellectual) 
property does not imply the absence of a moral duty to use one’s property in certain ways.
29
 
3. HUMAN RIGHTS TO IMPROVED ACCESS TO AND AVAILABILITY OF ESSENTIAL 
MEDICINES FOR THE GLOBAL POOR, AND THE DUTIES OF UNIVERSITIES 
3.1. Is improved access to and availability of essential medicines for the global poor 
required by human rights? 
Let us return to UAEM, now that it has been clarified, to the degree necessary for our 
purposes, what human rights and a human right to health are, and how to determine who 
bears duties with regard to them. As explained, UAEM wants universities to conclude 
contracts with the pharmaceutical industry that make essential medicines affordable for 
people in low- and middle-income countries, and it urges universities to do more research 
aimed at developing new medicines for neglected diseases. But is making essential 
medicines more accessible and available for the world’s poor a matter of human rights, and 
                                                 
27
 Certain philosophers would argue that for agents to have duties across borders, extra arguments are 
needed. I tend to disagree: once an agent can do something at little cost, or was involved in bringing 
about a problem, and it is not grossly unfair to ask them to act, this is enough for regarding them as 
duty bearers (cf. Resnik 2006). It is true that there remain further questions to do with a moral division 
of labour in institutional arrangements etc. I will come back to this below.  
28
 See e.g. UDHR Art. 17; Art. 27(2), albeit, as said, the conception of human rights used in this 
article is not intended as an interpretation of the practice where, inter alia, the UDHR is central. 
29
 For a line of thought that is in some respects similar, see Illingworth 2012; cf. also Baker 2006. 
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more particularly of a human right to health, at all? In accordance with the account of human 
rights proposed above, the answer seems to be ‘yes’ if, most importantly, the protections and 
interests in question are important enough and if there are suitable duty bearers. More 
precisely, (1) these medicines should be of great help with (2) prevalent severe illnesses, and 
(3) there should be agents who are capable of improving access and availability. These 
agents will then in any case be appropriate duty bearers if they can act at little cost to 
themselves, and can do so effectively enough as to not to make it much better for them to 
direct their energies elsewhere instead. Let me discuss these conditions in turn. The first two 
are quite straightforward. Improving access to and availability of medicines will not be a 
requirement of human rights if doing so makes no great difference to at least a number of 
people’s very important interests. Then other causes will outweigh it and, at the concrete 
level at which we are now speaking, they will demand the limited resources (such as wealth 
and capacities) that can be devoted to human rights; one ought then to run schools and 
improve food security etc. instead of providing greater access to medicines. However, the 
essential medicines that UAEM is typically concerned with are effective against serious 
conditions, and usually widely prevalent ones.
30
 Nonetheless, providing access to such 
medicines may still not, in the end, be a matter of human rights. For suppose, and here we 
come to condition (3), that hardly anyone is capable of improving such access, or that it can 
only be done with a very great expenditure of resources (wealth, technological capacities 
etc.). Then it may called for to spend the resources in such a way that more can be achieved. 
If so, improving access to (admittedly important) medicines will in the end fail to qualify as 
a matter of human rights, and other causes will carry the day. This may also be the case if, 
although there are agents who would be capable of carrying out the task, it would be an 
extremely heavy burden on them, which it may be unreasonable to ask them to bear – 
although, as said, it will not always be unreasonable. It may, for example, not be 
unreasonable when they have made certain causal contributions to a problem existing in the 
first place. 
However, arguably there are agents around that can do a lot to improve access to essential 
medicines for the world’s poor, and for whom doing so in a number of cases also comes at 
little cost. I want to focus on universities in particular (other duty bearers will then, to an 
extent, automatically come into the picture).  
3.2. The human rights duties of universities to help improve access to and availability of 
essential medicines. 
I have argued that one plausible reason for attributing a duty to protect important interests is 
that some agent can do so at little cost to herself. 
Now universities can do a lot to protect the health of the global poor by improving the access 
to and availability of essential medicines. The pharmaceutical industry is in many contexts 
dependent on their expertise, and as a consequence universities frequently have a large 
                                                 
30
 Not all medicines on the WHO list are concerned with serious conditions but a great many are, and 
those are particularly important for UAEM. Moreover, I will only be talking about medicines that are 
of help to a fairly large number of people. Orphan drugs and the like raise special issues, spanning 
from the effective and efficient use of resources to equal treatment under human rights. Discussion of 
such issues must await a future occasion. 
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negotiation room with regard to the terms of the contracts they conclude. Kapczynski et al. 
state that ‘universities play an important role in the biomedical R&D system… This gives 
them the power to improve the lives of patients and also to collectively persuade private 
sector partners of the need for an open licensing approach.’ (2005, 1078)
31
 Hassoun observes 
that ‘on a conservative estimate, about a third of R&D is done by universities in high income 
countries’ and that ‘there is reason to believe pharmaceutical companies are coming to rely 
more and more on universities. Recently in-house pharmaceutical research has not been very 
productive… In light of its dry pipeline, the pharmaceutical industry is “searching ever more 
desperately for drugs to license from small biotechnology companies and universities” 
(Angell, 2004, 236).’ (2010, 11–12) But just what can universities do at little cost? 
Concluding contracts with the pharmaceutical industry that are more favourable to the 
world’s poor and doing more research into neglected diseases is quite general. Is it possible 
to be more precise about what constitutes ‘little cost’ for universities? 
What is little cost for universities? 
As said, I use the expression ‘little cost’ more widely than financial cost – although financial 
cost will often be an aspect. I want to propose that a university faces little cost if it can in 
broad outline continue with its research and education as before – in this case, before 
concluding contracts including appropriate provisions for making essential medicines 
accessible to the global poor, and before doing more research into neglected diseases.  
Let me try to make this idea of little cost for a university more concrete – little cost as a 
university’s being able ‘in broad outline to continue’ to carry out its research and education 
as before. (I will have to say more below about the conception of the mission of universities 
that is associated with this idea, and also about the difference between little cost for, on the 
one hand, universities as a whole and, on the other hand, one particular university.) The 
expression ‘in broad outline’ is meant to convey that universities could give up minor 
aspects of what they are doing but not major aspects. Substantive judgement is required to 
determine what is minor/major. I believe that the following are plausibly some central 
elements:
32
 a particular university may often still in broad outline carry out its research and 
education as before if it loses one particular research project, but not if it loses a whole 
research line or even a main subject area; then its fields of research would not nearly be 
equally well covered any more. It may lose a small percentage of its budget, but not a large 
part. It may lose a small percentage of its staff and still in broad outline carry on as before 
but not a larger percentage.
33
 
In saying this, I assume that a university’s mission is to do research and often also to provide 
(tertiary) education.
34
 Of course one may conceive of the mission of a university in different 
ways as well; one such alternative way would be to say that universities also have a direct 
social mission to alleviate such ills as those associated with global poverty. But this way of 
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 The authors are talking specifically about the USA. (An ‘open licensing approach’ is their specific 
proposal for changing a regime with monopolistic price-setting powers. It is beyond the present scope 
to discuss that proposal.) 
32
 The background methodology I use in making these assessments is reflective equilibrium. See 
footnote 16 above. 
33
 For clarity I will work with just two categories: small and large cost.  
34
 I will not be talking about universities which are exclusively devoted to education. 
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conceiving of the mission of universities risks begging the question in that it has duties 
towards the global poor largely follow by stipulation instead of argument.
35
 Moreover, to 
focus on doing research and providing (tertiary) education is one common way of conceiving 
of the mission of universities (see e.g., also for discussion, Jones et al. 2005; Calhoun 
2009).
36
 I will go with this conception here. Some universities, it should be added, have a 
specific area or focus of research while some cover a wide array of fields and specialisations.  
   Of course I do not want to imply that in every specific case it is clear whether one is 
talking about small or large cost for a university; and it needs explanation (which will be 
given in a moment) why it should be morally relevant at all for a university to be able to 
carry on ‘as before’. Also, emphatically, it is not always the case that it comes at a price for a 
university to do more research into neglected (e.g. tropical) diseases and to conclude 
contracts with the pharmaceutical industry which ensure much better access to essential 
medicines in low- and middle-income countries than patent-based monopoly pricing does. 
Doing these things may, for example in financial respects, not cost universities anything but 
rather be advantageous to them. Kapczynski et al. state that ‘there is no significant economic 
risk associated with the shift [to an open licensing approach] – to the contrary, it has the 
potential to increase the resources available to universities’ (2005, 1078). However, this will 
not be the case for every university and in all instances, so it remains important to get clear 
about the cost to itself that a university may be morally required to take on.  
Little cost for universities: its moral relevance 
In short, I have argued that universities should in any case do what they can do at little cost 
to themselves, and that when they incur great cost to themselves things will be less clear. 
Sometimes, for example when they have been involved in causing the plight of people in 
need, they will still have moral duties to help them out; but it will be less clear whether as a 
general rule they must always, even when the cost to themselves is great, still help out 
people in great need. Now someone may say: why so – why shouldn’t universities always 
clearly do more than what they can do at little cost? To make this doubt clearer, let me 
compare individual persons and universities. In the case of individual persons, one may say 
that they too, as long as they can do so at small cost, are in any case morally obliged to help 
out others in dire need. If the cost to individual persons is large, views will diverge: some 
will say that they must still help others as long as these are worse off than themselves, while 
others will say that persons may to a certain extent be partial towards themselves. The 
theoretical underpinnings of such a position in favour of partiality may be many: one can 
refer, for example, to rule consequentialist (e.g. Hooker 2000), contractualist (e.g. Scanlon 
1998), or hybrid (e.g. Scheffler 1994) moral theories. What is often involved in such 
arguments is that persons have a life of their own to live. But universities do not have lives 
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 Similar risks could be run by different conceptions of the mission of universities which included 
social responsibilities more directly than via doing research and providing education. 
36
 Cf. also http://www.iau-aiu.net/sites/all/files/IAU_nutshell_Septembre_2015.pdf. For patents of any 
kind (also university-owned) in relation to the university’s mission, cf. Van Overwalle 2006. This 
article’s conception of that mission implies a degree of openness of dissemination of research results, 
but much more detailed discussion would be needed to see exactly how much, and how patents of 
different kinds (product, process etc.) relate to this. I will not pursue this track in exploring whether 
universities are required to engage in open licensing etc. 
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of their own to live, so why could there be a moral reason (at least a not easily overridden 
pro-tanto moral reason) that they might be allowed to avoid great cost to themselves? 
Let me first consider universities in general rather than one particular university.
37
 My 
assumption is, as said, that the mission of universities is to do research in a wide variety of 
fields and to provide tertiary education. Now these are important goals – important for 
meeting the needs of the population and for maintaining a stable and minimally just society. 
As long as these goals are not jeopardized, universities must in any case do what they can to 
help people in dire straits out. By contrast, if they are jeopardized, again a variety of moral 
views (such as forms of rule consequentialism or contractualism
38
) may argue that they do 
not have do so anymore, because there are important goods at stake. The opportunity for 
persons to live a life of their own could figure here too, but indirectly. It could help explain 
why, on a variety of moral views, rules are unacceptable which would allow or require 
certain goods, safeguarded by universities, to be compromised.   
So in the end, things do seem similar for universities and individual persons: universities, 
too, should at least do what they can at little cost – and when the cost is not small, matters 
are less clear and there will be different views.
39
 
However, just when are the goals of doing research in a wide variety of fields and providing 
tertiary education no longer carried out well enough? In particular, is there any ground for 
thinking that this, as was implied above, is no longer the case if universities cannot carry on 
doing research and providing education broadly as they were doing before? Why the 
relevance of the temporal comparison (‘before concluding more favourable contracts/doing 
more research into neglected diseases’)? To answer: a crucial observation here is, I think, 
that it is hard to say what exactly is needed for fulfilling the goals of universities sufficiently 
well: could we do with fewer universities, universities with fewer departments, universities 
with less funding? However, one can say, assuming at least that these goals are currently 
served sufficiently well by a university system at a given place, that they will in any case 
continue to be served sufficiently well if things at universities can in broad outline carry on 
as before – that is to say, more particularly, with more or less the same funding, number and 
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 Little cost for a particular university will be dealt with under the complication ‘fairness between 
universities’, below. 
38
 Although other views, such as act consequentialism, will say that universities do have to do more. I 
have in mind varieties of all these theories which are applicable to our present world, where a lot of 
background conditions have, at least provisionally, to be taken as givens. 
39
 There will, on many views, always be certain side constraints that universities have to observe even 
at large cost: furthering the goals that universities serve may not come at the price of violating these 
side constraints. For example, universities may not kill people and must, if necessary, bear great costs 
to themselves to avoid doing this. This raises the question whether they ought not at all costs to avoid 
concluding patent-based contracts with the pharmaceutical industry. For such contracts, will – e.g. 
compared with alternatives including a clause which allows for generic licensing – foreseeably leave 
people to die. Still, I believe that concluding patent-based contracts and expecting these to be 
maintained and enforced, is not the same as actively killing people. It is rather somewhere between 
‘doing’ an ‘letting happen’ (pace Pogge 2004, 2005). Thus from a prohibition to kill people it cannot 
be immediately concluded that universities should always insist on contracts such as those allowing 
for generic production even if it comes at great cost to them. 
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size of departments, etc. It is therefore safe to say that universities ought at least to do for 
people in need what they can do up to that point.
40
 
Five complications of the argument    
Let us consider five complications of the argument (which could also give rise to 
objections): 1) how does the position that has been proposed deal with fairness between 
universities; 2) the position proposed concerns what universities should do for people in need 
– but why exactly should they do this by supporting the specific UAEM-proposals rather 
than by doing something else; 3) which agents within universities are envisaged by the 
argument that has been outlined; 4) shouldn’t one, at least for public universities, employ a 
conception of the mission of universities that directly refers to social responsibilities after all; 
and 5) does the position that has been outlined also apply to universities which are (partly) 
privately funded? 
1) Can one university have a moral duty to take action if others do not cooperate?
41
 This is a 
hard question. It is certainly unfair to that university, but it would be even more unfair to the 
world’s poor if that university did not take action. Consequently a particular university 
should, I believe, do what it can do at small cost to itself even if other universities do not 
cooperate. If, by contrast, a particular university were to sacrifice, for example, a major 
research line or subject area that it covers, this will have great cost for that university and 
importantly it is (as argued above) also not clear, generally, that this can be done with small 
cost to the goals of universities generally: the goals of providing scientific research in a wide 
array of subject areas and providing tertiary education. In general, it is not clear that these 
goals remain equally well served if the university landscape suffers a setback in terms of 
research lines, research groups etc. 
2) If a university does what it can at little cost to itself, why should it devote its efforts to 
concluding contracts with the pharmaceutical industry which include clauses to improve 
access to essential medicines, and to doing more research into neglected diseases? Why 
should it not rather do something else? The general answer must be that, as a matter of moral 
division of labour, a university should concentrate its efforts where it can work relatively 
effectively and efficiently. This is, as indicated before, the case for the UAEM proposals, 
with regard to which universities seem to have a lot of room to take relatively effective 
action.
42
 So this is likely to be one of the areas where universities have a moral duty.    
3) Obviously, universities can only act through natural persons. Heads of departments, 
university boards and university deans and presidents, and sometimes professors who have 
major subject areas under their remit, are the relevant persons to think of. They are in a 
position to take decisions concerning reallocation of funding and the like compatibly with a 
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 If universities are, at a given time and place, not able to carry out these goals sufficiently well things 
will, by definition, at least not become significantly worse if they stay in broad outline the same. It 
will vary what duties universities have towards the global poor in such a situation. 
41
 I assume here that a university can still act effectively, and am not thinking of instances where this 
is not so (e.g. where effectiveness depends on the collective bargaining power of universities). 
42
 For elaboration (and some qualification), see footnote 13 above. 
Universities’ moral duties 
56 
 
university being able, in broad outline, to realize its goals as it was doing before.
43
 Mostly, 
individual researchers, professors, and students are not in such a position. However, they are 
often in a position (collectively or also individually) to exert some influence to get their 




4) It has been argued above that it is in any case important that the mission of universities is 
not articulated in such a way as to presuppose that it has duties to advance the lot of the 
global poor. For then one risks substituting stipulation for argument. It could be objected that 
there is a good reason for including concern for the world’s poor in a university’s mission, 
namely, that it receives public funding.
45
 The underlying idea could be that those who fund 
the university’s research should also in some way benefit from it (where I want to leave open 
whether every funder should benefit equally). But if this were the thought, the global poor 
often would not come into the picture, and the benefits should go to the citizens of the 
country with whose public money the university in question is funded.
46
 It is important, then, 
to note that according to the above argument, the reason why universities must at least do 
what they can do at little cost to themselves has nothing to do with the source of their 
funding. That reason is, rather, that their central goals are not jeopardized when they do what 
they can do at little cost to themselves.  
5) However, it might still be that if a university is not publicly but privately funded (or to 
some degree privately funded), this does play a role in its moral duties towards the global 
poor. If (or to the extent that) it is privately funded it may, one could think, justifiably cater 
to (the interests or wishes of) its private funders rather than to certain larger, more public 
goods or preferences; if a university is privately funded, the funders may organize its 
research and education as fits them (as long as they observe certain constraints). However, I 
think that this is mistaken. As I have argued earlier, while the private funders may have 
certain property- (and similar) rights here, they may still have a moral duty to do certain 
things for the global poor. One may have a property right, which implies among other things 
that other people may not do certain things with the money or goods that are one’s property, 
and simultaneously one may have moral duties to use one’s property in certain ways. And I 
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 Their actions will always affect some specific persons in their university for the worse, but this is so 
with very many things they do. 
44
 This moral duty may be based on them too, as persons, having to do, morally, at least what they can 
do at little cost to themselves. Cf. [Philips 2007]. 
   It is beyond the scope of the present paper to consider whether legislators should enforce that 
universities live up to their moral duties – a subject which involves many complications. 
45
 Rachel Kiddell Monroe explains that a thought of this kind played a role in starting up UAEM: that 
public universities should not develop medicines which could then, due to their price, be out of reach 
of the global poor. See http://uaem.org/who-we-are/history/ (accessed 2 April 2017).   
46
 Of course, more complex arguments, which often involve a lot of elements from the global justice 
literature, e.g. arguments appealing to a duty of assistance on the part of rich countries (Rawls 1999), 
could still make a case for duties towards the global poor. I will not further pursue this possibility 
here. 
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have argued above that there is in fact a moral duty to do for people in need at least what one 
can do at little cost to oneself.
47
 
In sum, I have argued that universities should at least do what they can do at little cost to 
improve the access to and availability of essential medicines for the global poor. Let me 
emphasize again that this is not to suggest that improving such access and availability always 
comes at a cost to universities. There can be, and often will be (Kapczynski et al. 2005), win-
win situations where both the global poor and universities benefit. And these should be made 
use of to the full. 
3.3. Objections: other duty bearers, innovation, structural change. 
Let us now consider some important objections that could be made to the above argument, to 
do with the duties of other parties (the pharmaceutical industry, governments), safeguarding 
pharmaceutical innovation, and bringing about structural change. First of all, one may say 
that the pharmaceutical industry should in many contexts of its own accord propose contracts 
and terms more favourable to the global poor than the present ones, and that it should invest 
more heavily in medicines for diseases that disproportionately strike the poor. Let us assume 
that this is so; in any case, it is plausible that the industry has human rights duties to improve 
the access to and availability of essential medicines for the global poor (see Mills et al. 2006; 
Baker 2006; Khosla and Hunt 2012; Illingworth 2012) based on, among other things, the 
consideration it can do a lot of things here at little cost.
48
 To elaborate on the industry being 
required to do morally at least what it can do at little cost: this is the minimum one must ask 
of it even if one assumes that it serves goods that ought to be preserved in broad outline, and 
that so preserving them implies that pharmaceutical companies should in general stay in 
business and, relatedly, make some profits. Yet if, as is at present often the case (see e.g. 
Baker 2006; Mannan and Story 2006; Selgelid and Sepers 2006), the industry is not fulfilling 
its duties, and can at least for now not be brought to fulfill them, shouldn’t the slack then be 
taken up by others? My answer is affirmative: if universities (and others) were not to take up 
the slack at least to the extent that they can do at little cost to themselves, it is the global poor 
who pay the price. At the same time, it is a plausible part of the duties of universities (and 
others) to pressure the industry into acting as they should. The aim should be to get the 
industry to take up their duties as fully and as soon as possible.
49
 
A second prominent objection is that arrangements which are favourable to the world’s poor, 
such as those that universities might be able to negotiate, would stifle pharmaceutical 
innovation. They may do this, it is sometimes said, by compromising the industry’s profits. I 
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 What if a private university has as its mission to, say, help alleviate the plight of the poor as best it 
can? Then there is at least no conflict with having to do for the poor at least what it can do at little 
cost. Whether there are other conflicts between such a mission and goods that universities commonly 
serve, and how to resolve such conflicts, is beyond the present scope. 
48
 Illingworth (2012, 80-81) argues that giving shareholder value its due does not prevent duties from 
arising for the pharmaceutical industry to improve access to essential medicines. According to her, 
duties to assist the needy outweigh the various grounds on which duties to maximize shareholder 
value are typically based (such as the utility of doing so, that agreements should be honoured, and that 
shareholders ought to be able to freely reap the benefits of their property or investment). 
49
 According to Alkoby (2012) activism that engages in naming and shaming etc. can have great 
influence to get governments and business companies to perform their plausible human-rights duties. 
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want to consider various things that this objection may assume or suggest, and investigate 




First of all, the argument may be read as suggesting that in situations of global monopolistic 
price setting and the consequent industry profits, all the incentives for innovation are in place 
that one would want from a justice perspective. The reply can be that this is very unlikely to 
be true (see Ford 2006; Sterckx 2005). For example, there are obviously very few incentives 
to develop medicines for diseases that primarily affect the world’s poor,
51
 and the UAEM-
proposals aim to provide just these: legal obligations such as contracts also (through 
sanctions etc.) provide incentives to behave accordingly. 
Still, secondly, some would say that certain incentives for innovation that do currently exist, 
might disappear if the pharmaceutical industry made no profits. This objection assumes that 
patents and monopoly pricing are generally important for pharmaceutical innovation in the 
first place, an assumption which has been criticized by many authors (e.g. Sterckx 2005; 
Mannan and Story 2006; Radder 2006, Ch. 16; Sterckx 2011).
52
  
And even if one assumes that they do contribute to it, it could be possible to maintain patents 
and monopoly pricing for some medicines.
53
 The industry could then make money with these 
medicines and would have incentives to develop such medicines. Provisions in contracts that 
allow for generic production of essential medicines etc. if there is a need for this in low- and 
middle-income countries, need not jeopardize such innovation. And as far as these essential 
medicines for the global poor are themselves concerned, there are, as said, few incentives to 
develop them in the first place under patent- and monopoly pricing regimes, so that 
                                                 
50
 It may be asked: how can the decrease (or lack thereof) of pharmaceutical innovation influence 
whether there is a human right to access to essential medicines? Or put generally: how is it that 
contingent economic considerations may impact on the existence of a human right? (Many thanks to 
[Dzintars Gotham] for raising an objection along those lines.) As I see it, the answer is twofold. First, 
suppose this human right is fairly abstractly formulated, for example as ‘there should be some 
protections in place of access to essential medicines’. Then there is always something one can make of 
this formulation, so the right would always exist – even if the access would be severely restricted (e.g. 
for the sake of safeguarding innovation). Secondly, however, if we are talking about specific 
protections, whether there is a human right to them does potentially depend on the impact of providing 
these protections on innovation. After all, pharmaceutical innovation increases the possibilities to 
protect important interests of people alive in the future. If better access to medicines for the current 
global poor had reduced innovation as its price, the question will be which of the two protections must 
get precedence (for the global poor now or for people alive in the future; cf. [Philips 2016]). 
51
 Or also, for that matter, to develop antibiotics. 
52
 Cf. also http://www.who.int/research-observatory/ro_publwg/en/ (accessed 2 April 2017). Although 
without some profits, pharmaceutical companies may have little money to spend on innovation or may 
go out of business altogether, the main engines of innovation often lie elsewhere, outside the industry. 
Also, even with a lot of profits the industry frequently engages little in innovation. Sometimes, these 
phenomena go under the heading of ‘market failure’, a remarkable expression given the great role of 
monopoly pricing in this field. 
53
 It could also be possible to make profits by other means than through monopoly pricing (cf. Pogge 
2008). However, I will not explore this possibility here. 
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obviously innovation here is not jeopardized by the UAEM-proposals that universities 
conclude contracts which increase access to essential medicines for the global poor.
54
 
Thirdly, let us for a moment assume that concluding such contracts would have a great and 
adverse impact on pharmaceutical innovation  – although this is, as indicated, a large and 
dubious assumption. Then in many cases providing access will still have to get precedence 
from a moral perspective. This is so in cases where the lack of access to essential medicines 
has very severe consequences for very many people, as it often will. There is a point where 
the severity combined with the number of people are such that one can simply not accept to 
let it happen, even if very many more people in the future may be severely affected by less 
innovation. What makes the balance clear in such cases is that the present threats are 
imminent while the future is still comparatively far-off and ways may be found after all to 
avert the threats to those then alive ([cf. Philips 2016]).   
So much for the objection that increasing access would get in the way of pharmaceutical 
innovation. A third objection is that universities cannot bring about structural change even in 
the modest sense of providing the global poor with a modicum of guarantee – which is what 
human rights generally envisage – of access to essential medicines.
55
 It is surely true that the 
pharmaceutical industry, governments, and international organisations also have a role to 
play: universities cannot provide guaranteed access all by themselves.
56
 But this is true for 
most (if not all) of these other agents too – even governments cannot go it alone but are 
dependent for certain things on the industry, and on other agents in civil society. However, 
this dependence does not prevent governments (including those of developing countries: 
Ford 2006) and others agents from having duties in realising the protections which are a 
matter of human rights. It is similar for universities.  
Here is a further objection: suppose that there were an institutional arrangement that was 
clearly superior to the UAEM proposals with regard to increasing access to and availability 
of essential medicines for the global poor, and that the duties of universities in this 
arrangement were much smaller than the ones I have suggested (or were even none). I want 
to say two things about such an arrangement. First, it should become very clear what the 
arrangement would be: we cannot dismiss duties merely on the basis of some vague 
hypothetical possibility; that would become a game of hide-and-seek. Second, one should be 
careful what the arrangement is an arrangement for. One can (as for example Thomas Pogge 
and others did
57
) devise a rather grand institutional idea for the somewhat longer term and 
which presupposes that some governments or private investors come forward with a rather 
large sum of money. Or one can keep closer to taking the present behaviour of governments 
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 Some medicines would be profitable in rich countries as well as needed for the global poor. There is 
then a possibility of having a dual system (differential pricing). It is beyond the present scope to 
discuss the various empirical aspects of this. For relevant sources see uaemevidence.wordpress.com 
(accessed 29 September 2016). 
55
 If the idea were that guarantees of access can only be provided by law, that seems false. As Henry 
Shue observes, in some cases ‘well-entrenched customs, backed up by taboos, might serve better than 
laws…’ (1996, 16). However, the practical importance of this observation in a globalised world may 
be limited. 
56
 Cf. footnote 13 above. 
57
 Cf. also http://incentivesforglobalhealth.org/origin/ (accessed on 2 April 2017). 
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and some other agents, such as the pharmaceutical industry (Pogge 2008, Ch. 9; also 
Banerjee, Hollis and Pogge 2010
58
) and try to improve the situation from there: try to change 
that behaviour where called for and, if this is not possible, make the most of it within the 
constraints set by that behaviour. This is what the UAEM-proposals that this article has 
focused on, and in which universities have clear roles, try to do. One may endorse these 
proposals and at the same time advocate, for the longer run, a more fundamental institutional 
overhaul.
59
 Typically such an overhaul would seek more structural ways to improve access to 
essential medicines and ways to stimulate R&D concerning neglected medicines, ways not 
dependent on patents and industry profits. It is beyond the present scope to discuss what such 
a more structural change (and the incentives associated with it) would look like. However, it 
is important to mention that, as indicated earlier, UAEM is also currently supporting a 
WHO-sponsored initiative aimed at more structural and large-scale change: an initiative to 
reach a global R&D agreement which aims at achieving firstly, sustainable, global health 
needs-based funding; secondly, that innovation is not dependent on high prices; and thirdly, 
at more R&D innovation.
60
 Thus UAEM’s view is, it seems, that one can both try to achieve 
better contracts and more R&D from universities and more structural and wide-ranging 
improvement in the access and availability of essential medicines for the global poor. 
Still, this gives rise to a last concern. One would usually not want short-term arrangements to 
get in the way of arguably better or more ambitious long-term solutions. As just indicated, 
UAEM’s own view seems to be that more short-term initiatives and more structural 
initiatives are compatible. But is this correct? Will the UAEM-proposals that universities 
negotiate better contracts and do more research into neglected diseases really not get in the 
way of more structural solutions? It is indeed likely that they will not, if their advocates 
remain aware – as UAEM clearly does, given, for example its support of the WHO-initiative 
– of the importance that larger-scale, longer-term solutions also need to be achieved, and if 
they keep thinking about where there could be possible collisions and how to avoid those. 
And even if they did get in the way, two things must be noted. First, the direct alleviation of 
need and suffering also counts for quite something. ‘Sacrificing’ the health of the current 
global poor for the sake of attaining a long-term solution – which will perhaps never 
materialise – is usually hardly defensible. Second, and relatedly, if helping now should make 
a long-term solution more difficult to achieve, by for example (as will be plausible in certain 
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 Pogge takes the profit-orientedness of the pharmaceutical industry as a given but still tries to delink 
pharmaceutical innovation and drug pricing. I actually think his is a very good and interesting 
proposal, but that it may speak primarily to a somewhat different (namely, more long-term) problem 
than do the UAEM-proposals that I have mentioned. Interestingly and importantly, Pogge also has 
attention for the social and logistical aspects of improving access, which are not the focus of the 
present article. 
59
 Incidentally, that long-term solution is very likely one where agents at different levels have a role to 
play: international institutions, governments, the pharmaceutical industry, civil society organisations – 
and among the latter also universities. Good, stable institutional arrangements involve a variety of 
agents and a variety of institutional levels; some things will have to be done close to home, others 
further away (cf. Pogge 1992). It is therefore, although it is beyond the present scope to consider 
exactly the duties of universities in an ideal institutional arrangement, very unlikely that such duties 
would be none. 
60
 http://uaem.org/our-work/campaigns/the-alternative-biomedical-rd-system-campaign/ (accessed 2 
April 2017) 
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concrete cases) encouraging governments to shirk their duties, the appropriate answer mostly 
is not to leave the current poor out in the cold. It is rather to help them now nonetheless, and 
simultaneously to work very hard to achieve more structural solutions, and to get 
governments and the industry etc. to fulfill their plausible duties. Universities will also have 
a duty when such long-term activism is called for – an observation which supports UAEM’s 
call on academics to endorse the WHO initiative.
61
 They have this duty for the same reasons 
– to do with capacities and arguably also causal involvements of certain kinds – that they 
have duties to carry out the UAEM-proposals to improve access to and availability of 
essential medicines.  
4. CONCLUSION 
I have argued that universities have duties in relation to the human right to health. More 
particularly, these duties are in line with what UAEM wants universities to do: to negotiate 
contracts with the pharmaceutical industry that provide the global poor with much better 
access to important medicines, and to do substantially more research into neglected diseases 
that mainly strike the poor. I then understand human rights as demands that important 
individual interests are protected against prevalent threats. This is a moral conception of 
human rights which preserves a substantial connection with the post-WWII practice of 
human rights. Yet rather than aiming to interpret this practice, it aims to articulate plausible 
minimum requirements of global justice which can orient the development of this practice. 
One plausible human right is a human right to health: to protection of health against 
prevalent threats. I have argued that the minimum duties that come with human rights and a 
human right to health are based, among other things, on what parties can do at little cost to 
themselves (and also, for example, on whether they actively helped to cause human rights 
problems in the past). This is the basis for arguing that universities, understood as 
organisations whose aim is to do research and provide education, have human right-related 
duties in line with what UAEM urges them to do. This is so for universities that are publicly 
funded but also for universities that are (partly) privately funded. I have also considered a 
number of objections to do, among other things, with the duties of other parties such as 
governments and the pharmaceutical industry, the need to safeguard pharmaceutical 
innovation, and the need for more structural solutions. 
As for this last point, further research is certainly needed into possible (longer- or shorter-
term) institutional arrangements for realising the human right to health and to access to and 
availability of essential medicines in particular, and into the problems and advantages of 
these arrangements. For example, UAEM is currently campaigning in favour of one such 
arrangement, a WHO-sponsored initiative to achieve a global agreement where R&D is 
sustainably funded and based on global health needs. What are particularly strong and weak 
points of such an initiative, compared with possible alternatives? And how do short-term 
initiatives contribute (or not) to achieving more structural and wide-ranging change as it is 
envisaged by such an initiative? These are some important questions for future research. 
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 This duty involves a duty to work together where this is needed to achieve results. This duty will 
fall on agents within universities who especially have capacities to initiate or maintain such 
collaboration. 
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For now, I have argued that universities have duties when it comes to negotiating contracts 
with the pharmaceutical industry and with regard to doing research into neglected diseases 
that disproportionately strike the global poor. Not only that; but these are human rights 
duties. This means that they are very weighty. If universities do not live up to these duties, 
that is an especially serious failure. Conversely, if they do live up to them, this will 
contribute a lot to them being able to look themselves in the eye. 
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